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The Quixotic Dilemma, 
California’s Immutable Culture of 
Incarceration 
 
Geri Lynn Green* 
 
Abuse of power has always fed on the sophisticated 
ignorance and postural unconcern of the people.  The 
continuing problem with the California Department of 
Corrections is no exception.  As Thomas Jefferson said, 
―information is the currency of democracy.‖1  California 
desperately needs transparency and accountability to 
reinvigorate the active participation of its citizenry to demand 
responsible solutions to the problems in the California penal 
system. 
California leads in many categories, some admirable, 
others dubious.  Its gross state product (―GSP‖) is the largest in 
the country and in 2008 represented 13% of the gross domestic 
product (―GDP‖) of the United States.2  Texas, with the second 
largest GSP, has approximately two-thirds the population of 
 
  
*
  Geri Lynn Green is a partner at the San Francisco-based law firm 
Green & Green, LLP.  She specializes in trial and appellate litigation in 
federal and state courts.  She has extensive experience with complex 
litigation in areas including civil rights, criminal, quasi-criminal actions 
including antitrust, RICO, tax fraud/money laundering and white collar 
crime, prisoner‘s rights, ADA, employment discrimination, unfair trade 
practices, contract, family law, attorney‘s fees litigation, and business torts.  
She has been an active Board Member of Legal Services for Prisoners with 
Children, and a member of the Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyer‘s 
Network.  She has written reports and presented before United Nations 
bodies concerning human rights violations in U.S. prisons and has co-
authored a manual on drafting shadow reports, entitled Demanding Our 
Rights. 
1. ICON GROUP INT‘L, INC., JEFFERSON: WEBSTER‘S QUOTATIONS, FACTS 
AND PHRASES 391 (2008). 
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by State (GDP 
by State) Interactive Map, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmap/GDP 
Map.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
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California3 and its contribution to the U.S. GDP is 
approximately two-thirds that of California.4  California alone 
is the eighth largest economy in the world,5 and regrettably has 
the distinction of being the third largest penal system in the 
world, behind only China and the United States Bureau of 
Prisons.6 
Recent disclosures have revealed another distinction for 
California: its prisons.  Despite an annual budget of nearly ten 
billion for the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (a sum greater than the total revenue of thirty- 
of the States),7 California‘s prisons are run like those that 
might be found in the Third World. 
In the federal district court case that put the California 
prison system into receivership, Judge Thelton Henderson 
found that the root cause of the problem was a ―historical lack 
of leadership, planning, and vision by the State‘s highest 
officials during a period of exponential growth of the prison 
population.‖8  California‘s prison system, he found, was ―a 
textbook example of how . . . political institutions sometimes 
fail to muster the will to protect a disenfranchised, stigmatized, 
and unpopular subgroup of the population.‖9  In California, the 
―failure of political will, combined with a massive escalation in 
the rate of incarceration over the past few decades, has led to a 
 
  3. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that Texas had a population of 
24,782,302 in 2009.  U.S. Census Bureau, Texas—Population Finder,  
http://www.census.gov (select ―Texas‖ under ―Population Finder‖) (last visited  
Mar. 21, 2010).  By contrast, California had an estimated population of 
36,961,664 in 2009.  Id. (select ―California‖ under ―Population Finder‖). 
4. Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 2. 
5. CTR. FOR CONTINUING STUDY OF THE CAL. ECON., 2008 CALIFORNIA 
ECONOMY RANKINGS 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-Aug09_2008-California-Economy-
Rankings.pdf. 
6. Amy E. Lerman, The People Prisons Make: Effects of Incarceration on 
Criminal Psychology, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 151 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 
2009). 
7. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation—Budget 
Management, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Budget/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2010). See also U.S. Census Bureau, States Ranked by Total State Taxes: 
2009, http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/09staxrank.html (last visited May 
21, 2010). 
8. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 
2005). 
9. Id. at *32. 
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serious and chronic abdication of State responsibility . . . .‖10 
Any analysis of California‘s prison dilemma requires an 
understanding of the economic and political forces that brought 
us to this point.  Fueled by U.S. expansion of its military-
industrial complex with enormous development projects and 
construction,11 California enjoyed its place in the sun, the 
Golden State where dreams really could come true. 
Indeed, by 1945, the Federal Government was investing 
more than 10% of its spending in California, which at that time 
comprised 7% of the nation‘s population.12  After World War II, 
while most of the nation‘s war industries reconverted to the 
production of consumer goods, California was the beneficiary of 
increased federal investment in the form of prime Department 
of Defense (DOD) contracts for its aerospace industry and 
electronics research and development.  As a result, California 
received the highest dollar volume of prime DOD contracts of 
any state between 1958 and 1991.13  The growth of these DOD-
spawned industries required the state to make immense 
investments in its own infrastructure to accommodate the 
resulting population expansion.  New science/engineering-
based jobs required a highly educated and specialized labor 
force, causing the state to craft and fund a ―master plan‖ for 
higher education, which pledged an appropriate postsecondary 
education at public expense to every high school graduate.14 
As a result, Californians enjoyed what appeared to be 
limitless employment opportunities, the nation‘s best grade 
schools, affordable and accessible higher education, affordable 
housing, newly built infrastructure to provide the new 
population with hospitals and medical care, government 
agencies of every ilk, and hundreds of miles of roads and 
 
10. Id.  
11. BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON BELT TO SUNBELT: FEDERAL 
POLICY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH, 1938-
1980, at 150 (1994). 
12. See WALTON E. BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 425 
(1973).  
13. ANN R. MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT: THE MILITARY 
REMAPPING OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 13, 231 (1991).   
14. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Decorative Beasts: Dogging the Academy in the 
Late 20th Century, CAL. SOCIOLOGIST 14, 113-35 (1991); Richard Walker, 
California Rages Against the Dying of the Light, 209 NEW LEFT REV. 42-74 
(1995).  
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freeways.  In short, California offered an unparalleled lifestyle 
during the 1940s, ‗50s, and ‗60s, and it paid off, making 
California a significant global presence in its own right. 
The hope for a better life drove an unprecedented wave of 
migration to California during and in the aftermath of WWII.  
Indeed, the population doubled in size to some 20 million in 
1970, accounting for 1/10th of the nation, and grew to almost 25 
million by 1980.15  As the century began to wane, however, the 
state‘s population swell began to take its toll. 
Military spending cuts and reorganization in the late ‗60s 
resulted in significant, albeit temporary, middle-class job loss, 
causing the 1969-70 recession to hit California harder than the 
rest of the country and causing the unemployment rates to 
double.16  A confluence of a number of market forces over the 
ensuing decade stressed California‘s resources even further.  
OPEC price manipulation in the 1970s caused the price of oil to 
rise over twenty times what it was in the beginning of the 
decade.  These fluctuations had wide-ranging and substantial 
inflationary effects on the United States and California 
economies.17  Legislation in August of 1971 caused the yen to 
rise 50% against the dollar from 1971 to 1985; this in turn 
caused the dollar to go into a free fall and spurred Japanese 
investment in California real estate.  The 1974 Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA)18 made it unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant, which allowed mortgage 
lenders to take into account all income-earning members of the 
household.  Prior to this enactment, lenders had been confined 
to consideration of only the man‘s income.  With the increased 
buying power of two household income earners, a new wave of 
buyers was suddenly unleashed to compete for available 
housing inventory.  The global recession of 1973-1975, as well 
as high interest rates and the swelling labor pool, compounded 
the problem.  The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975—which 
 
15. See CAL. DEP‘T OF FIN., POPULATION OF CALIFORNIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1940 TO 2007, at 2 (2008) available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/FS_DATA/STAT-ABS/documents/B1.pdf. 
16. Michael B. Teitz, The California Economy: Changing Structure and 
Policy Responses, in CALIFORNIA POLICY CHOICES (John J. Kirlin & Donald R. 
Winkler eds., 1984). 
17. OPEC BEHAVIOUR AND WORLD OIL PRICES 19 (James M. Griffin, 
David J. Teece eds., 1982).  
18. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).  
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ended the Vietnam War—prompted the first large-scale wave 
of immigration from Vietnam, which continued for the next 
decade.  When the shah of Iran fell in January of 1979, 
California absorbed many of those Iranians who fled the 
Ayatollah Khomeini regime. 
With all these forces at work, California experienced an 
unprecedented rise in the price of real estate and a 
corresponding reassessment of real estate taxes based on 
market value.  California‘s municipal and state treasuries, 
which rely on property taxes, enjoyed substantial surpluses, 
with annual revenues exceeding expenditures.  Alarmed 
taxpayers waged a revolt that resulted in the passage of 
Proposition 13 in 1978.  Proposition 13 was a voter initiative 
that rolled the state residential and non-residential property 
taxes back to 1975 rates and shielded property from 
reassessment until it was sold. 
California‘s municipal governments, heavily dependent on 
property tax revenues to fund services, were severely impacted.  
School districts that had previously received more than 50% of 
their budget from property taxes in 1978 saw those 
contributions reduced to only 18% by 1988.19  Similarly, local 
governments were forced to reduce services to their neediest 
residents: the poor, homeless, mentally ill, substance abusers, 
developmentally disabled, and children.20 
Conservative California politicians responded to these 
crises with political platforms to lower taxes, cut spending, and 
ensure law and order.  With municipal budgets decimated, the 
state streamlined the process by warehousing offenders at 
state prisons instead of local facilities.  Ideals of rehabilitating 
criminal offenders were replaced with models of incapacitation.  
Lawmakers hastily passed laws, dramatically increasing 
prisoner populations without providing funding for education, 
vocational training, and rehabilitative programming.  At the 
same time, the state continued its deinstitutionalization of the 
mentally ill and the funds for their care dried up, forcing the 
shutdown of community facilities for the seriously mentally ill.  
Today, almost half of all prisoners are incarcerated for non-
 
19. Jeffrey Chapman I, The Fiscal Context, in 7 CALIFORNIA POLICY 
CHOICES (John J. Kirlin & Donald R. Winkler eds., 1984).  
20. Poverty among California‘s children rose twenty-five percent.  See 
Teitz, supra note 16. 
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violent, property, or drug crimes.21 
Such a shift allowed the Department of Corrections to 
steadily grow and amass enormous political power.  Today, it 
employs more than 66,000 staff members,22 more state 
employees than any other department; as such, it has a 
stranglehold on California politics. 
 
I.  The Present State of the California Prison System 
 
The increased imprisonment of drug offenders and other 
low-level non-violent offenders, the dismantling of California‘s 
mental health system, and the trend toward imposing long 
prison sentences has caused California‘s inmate population to 
swell over 500% since 1980, when the average adult population 
hovered around 24,000,23 to a whopping 170,000 in 2007.24  At 
the same time, the general population of the state has only 
seen a 64% increase.25  
 
 
21. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., CHARACTERISTICS OF FELON NEW 
ADMISSIONS AND PAROLE VIOLATORS RETURNED WITH A NEW TERM (2008), 
available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Br
anch/Annual/ACHAR1/ACHAR1d2008.pdf. 
22. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: MOVING FORWARD 3 
(2009), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2009_Press_Releases/docs/CDCR_Annual_Repor
t.pdf.  
23. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR., HISTORICAL TRENDS INSTITUTION PAROLE 
POPULATION 1976-1996, at 3a (1997) available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Br
anch/Annual/HIST2/HIST2d1996.pdf.  The Institution population is 170,186, 
as derived from the Offender Base Information Systems (OBIS) dataset 
created on January 28, 2010.  The data has been collected and reported for 
only the main institutions.  See CAL. REHAB. OVERSIGHT BD., BIANNUAL 
REPORT app. B (2010), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/Adult_Programs/docs/C-
ROB_Biannual_Report_March_15_2010.pdf. 
24. See generally CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR., supra note 23; CAL. DEP‘T OF 
CORR. & REHAB., HISTORICAL TRENDS 1987-2007 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Br
anch/Annual/HIST2/HIST2d2007.pdf. 
25. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, California Fact Sheet, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/CA.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
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California Population Trends According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture: 
Population 
  Rural * Urban * Total 
Year 
    1980 569,423 23,098,342 23,667,765 
    1990 713,834 29,046,187 29,760,021 
    2000 796,198 33,075,450 33,871,648 
    2009 (latest estimates) 833,075 36,128,589 36,961,664 
 
 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/CA.htm (last visited 4/18/2010.) 
 
 
The Department of Corrections currently oversees thirty-
three state adult prisons, eight juvenile facilities, more than 
forty minimum custody camps, twelve community correctional 
facilities, and several out-of-state private facilities.26 
The present number of inmates, 166,569,27 is twice that 
which the prisons were built to hold28 and more than double 
the number of inmates in 1989.29  In some cases, prisons are 
 
26. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES: THE 
CDCR STORY 3 (2009), available at  
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/CDCR_Story_051807.pdf.  
Throughout the state, there are more than 200 parole units and offices at 
nearly 100 locations serving adult and juvenile parolees.  See id.  This is in 
addition to nineteen re-entry centers and two restitution facilities that are 
operated by public or private agencies under CDCR contract.  See id. 
27. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., supra note 22, at 5. 
28. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 
4, 2009).  Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) 
and Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995), were joined for 
hearings in the three-judge panel described herein.  
29. See CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION 
AS OF MIDNIGHT JULY 31 1990 (1990), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Br
anch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad9007.pdf.  The 2009 figures do not take into 
account CDCR‘s forty camps, minimum custody facilities located in 
wilderness areas where inmates are trained as wild land firefighters; twelve 
community correctional facilities (―CCFs‖); five prisoner mother facilities or 
the juvenile facilities which account for an additional seven to ten thousand 
prisoners.  Furthermore, it does not take into account the parole and 
outpatient population which, as of December 31, 2008, was 123,597.  See CAL. 
DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT 
DECEMBER 31 2008 (2009), available at 
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crowded to 300% of capacity.30 
The accelerated growth in the prison population and 
bureaucracy was not accompanied by the organizational 
restructuring necessary to meet increasing system demands 
and to provide appropriate accountability and oversight.  The 
system today operates without necessary management 
structures, policy standardization, training information 
technology, or the ability to provide essential health care 
services and rehabilitative programming.  Individual wardens 
wield extensive independent authority to determine standards 
and operating procedures and often act with impunity.  A lack 
of accountability and transparency has created a ―massive 
waste of taxpayer money.‖31 
 
A. The State of Adult Corrections 
 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger 
are two separate court actions that have resulted in federal 
court oversight of California prisons.32  The Plata plaintiffs, 
prisoners with serious medical needs, filed suit in 2001 
claiming that the State failed to provide constitutionally-
adequate medical care.33  The State settled the matter in 2002 
and entered a stipulation for injunctive relief to improve 
medical care.  However, the defendants proved ―incapable of or 
unwilling to provide the stipulated relief.‖34  Over the 
intervening years, the district court entered numerous orders 
to remedy the violations, each one proving ineffective. 
The Coleman plaintiffs, prisoners with serious mental 
disorders, filed suit in 1990 alleging constitutionally 
inadequate mental health care.35  After a trial, the district 
court found the California prison mental health care system so 
 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Br
anch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0812.pdf. 
30. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *1. 
31. There is widespread medical malpractice and neglect resulting in, on 
average, at least one needless inmate death every six to seven days.  See 
Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *8. 
32. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 
4, 2009). 
33. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).  
34. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *3. 
35. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal.1995). 
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deficient as to violate the Eighth Amendment.36  The district 
court subsequently entered more than seventy orders over the 
course of fourteen years in a futile attempt to remedy the 
violations.37  As in Plata, crowding prevented meaningful 
reform.  The State has never sought to terminate the injunctive 
relief granted in either Plata or Coleman on the grounds that it 
has achieved constitutional compliance. 
According to California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
the prisons are places ―of extreme peril to the safety of 
persons.‖38  In 2006, the Governor declared a State of 
Emergency because the severe prison crowding ―has caused 
substantial risk to the health and safety of the men and women 
who work inside [these] prisons and the inmates housed in 
them.‖39  He further declared that ―immediate action is 
necessary to prevent death and harm caused by California‘s 
severe prison overcrowding.‖40 
Nonetheless, after almost twenty years of judicial 
oversight failing to improve the situation, the medical system 
was put into receivership by a federal court, and ultimately, on 
July 26, 2007, in the face of mounting deaths and inertia on the 
part of the defendants, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ordered that a single three-judge court be 
convened to consider population reduction.41 
The court found that one of the most visible consequences 
of the gap between the size of the prison population and the 
capacity of the prisons was the thousands of so-called ―ugly‖ 
beds—thousands of double and triple bunks ―crammed into 
gyms and dayrooms that were never meant to be used for 
housing.‖42  The former head of the Texas Department of 
 
36. Id. 
37. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *13. 
38. Id. at *1. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at *23 (quoting Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cal. Governor, Prison 
Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
41. The three judge district court was convened and granted motions to 
intervene on behalf of defendants by certain California district attorneys, 
sheriffs, police chiefs, probation officers, counties, and Republican state 
legislators.  Id. at 27.  The court also granted the motion by the California 
Correctional Peace Officers‘ Association, to intervene on behalf of plaintiffs. 
42. Id. at *42. 
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Criminal Justice testified that ―[i]n more than 35 years of 
prison work experience, I have never seen anything like it.‖43 
Overcrowding, including ―ugly‖ beds, is extraordinarily 
dangerous, according to the Governor‘s emergency 
proclamation.44  As described by a former high-ranking official 
in the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, ―the risk of catastrophic failure in a system 
strained from severe overcrowding is a constant threat.  As the 
Director of the Division of Adult Institutions . . . , it is my 
professional opinion this level of overcrowding is unsafe and we 
are operating on borrowed time.‖45 
On August 4, 2009, the three-judge district court panel 
issued its Opinion and Order, concluding after careful review 
and analysis of the evidence that plaintiffs had demonstrated 
that ―clear and convincing evidence establishes that crowding 
is the primary cause of the unconstitutional denial of medical 
and mental health care to California‘s prisoners.‖46  Thus, the 
court required the State to draft a plan to reduce the prison 
population.47 
In coming to this conclusion, the three-judge panel found 
that all of the steps defendants had taken under the Plata 
 
43. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
44. Id. at *42-43. 
45. Id. at *34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
46. Id. at 31.  These barriers to medical and mental health care include 
lack of physical space and shortages of staff.  The Court found that the 
crowded conditions themselves exacerbate prisoners‘ mental illness.  The 
mental health bed shortages: 
have created a destructive feedback loop that is now 
endemic to the CDCR's mental health care delivery system. 
Inmates denied necessary mental health placements are 
decompensating and are ending up in mental health 
conditions far more acute than necessary . . . creat[ing] a 
cycle of sicker people being admitted, with greater resources 
necessary to treat them, which then creates even further 
backlog in an already overwhelmed system. 
Id. at *41 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The overcrowding also 
has the potential to cause physical illness, by increasing risk of transmission 
of infectious disease.  Another result of crowding is that prison 
administrators rely heavily on lockdowns to exert control over the prisons 
resulting in further stress on the medical providers who must go cell to cell to 
deliver care.  As a direct result of all of these problems caused by crowding, 
the Court found that there are unacceptably high numbers of both 
preventable and possibly preventable deaths.  Id. at *32-56. 
47. Id. at *115-116. 
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court‘s supervision, as well as the steps taken under the 
Coleman court‘s supervision, had failed to remedy the 
constitutional deficiencies.48  That, the court determined, was 
due to ―[t]he crushing inmate population [which] has strained 
already severely limited space resources to the breaking point, 
and crowding is causing an increasing demand for medical and 
mental health care services, a demand with which defendants 
are simply unable to keep pace.‖49 
The State answered with a proposal to build more prisons 
but that answer was rejected by the court as the evidence 
demonstrated that any construction could not be completed for 
many years, during which time plaintiff class members would 
continue to suffer and die.50 
The court considered other options, such as simply hiring 
more staff, but found that crowding impedes recruitment and 
retention of health care staff, and, even if more staff were 
hired, there would be nowhere for them to work.51 
In conclusion, the court found that ―[t]he evidence 
establishes that ‗[r]educing the population in the system to a 
manageable level is the only way to create an environment in 
which other reform efforts, including strengthening medical 
management, hiring additional medical and custody staffing, 
and improving medical records and tracking systems, can take 
root in the foreseeable future.‘‖52 
Before arriving at this conclusion, the three-judge panel 
carefully considered whether an order to reduce the prison 
population by up to 40,000, to 137.5% of design capacity, would 
have an adverse impact on public safety.53  The court found 
that the crowded conditions in California prisons are actually 
increasing the crime rate because prisoners leave prison more 
dangerous than before.54  This is because the crowded prisons 
 
48. Id. at *115. 
49. Id. at *61. 
50. Id. at *102. 
51. Id. at *45-46. 
52. The Court, mindful of the problems inherent in such an order, did 
not order that CDCR ―throw open the doors of its prisons.‖  Id. at *78.  On the 
contrary, it advised that the State come up with a plan where they ―choose 
among many different options or combinations of options for reducing the 
prison population.‖  Id.  
53. Id. at *113-14. 
54. Id. at *85-87. 
11
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force prisoners into violent, crowded conditions with higher-
level offenders, and leave them unable to obtain rehabilitative 
programming because the physical space used for programming 
is now filled with beds.55 
The overwhelming evidence from local law enforcement 
officials was that ―the current combination of overcrowding and 
inadequate rehabilitation or re-entry programming in 
California‘s prison system itself has a substantial adverse 
impact on public safety and the operation of the criminal 
justice system.‖56  The State itself concurs.57  All agree that 
reducing crowding will ameliorate these problems, thus 
improving public safety. 
The court further noted that any reduction in the prison 
population would result in substantial savings to the State, 
possibly over one billion dollars, and the State‘s population 
reduction plan could require some portion of those funds be 
directed toward community programs to ameliorate any impact 
of a prison population reduction.58 
At the time of this drafting, the State has failed to comply 
with the court‘s order to produce a plan to reduce the prison 
population.  Accordingly, lawyers for the prisoners are seeking 
prosecution of Governor Schwarzenegger for his failure to 
comply with the court‘s order.  The Governor has asked the 
court for more time to coax concessions from the Legislature, 
which failed to approve a package of Schwarzenegger-backed 
reforms in the summer of 2009 that could have slashed about 
37,000 inmates from the state‘s prisons. 
The defendants continue to resist developing a plan and 
have appealed the order.  On September 18, 2009, the State 
filed a population reduction plan.  It was rejected by the court 
as the plan would not accomplish the population reduction 
ordered by the court.  However, if implemented, the plan would 
reduce the prison population somewhat by giving more good-
time credits and diverting certain parole violators and 
probation violators away from prison.  A revised plan was filed 
by defendants on November 12, 2009.  There continues to be 
 
55. Id.  
56. Id. at *85. 
57. Id. at *85-86. 
58. Id. 
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new developments in the efforts to reduce the severe 
overcrowding in California‘s state prisons.  However, as of this 
writing, none have been implemented and none will 
dramatically change the overall prison population without 
serious revisions of California‘s sentencing scheme. 
 
B. The Juvenile Problem 
 
The juvenile justice system finds itself similarly situated, 
plagued by excessive violence, overcrowding, and a 91% 
recidivism rate.59  In March 2006, a panel of state-approved 
correctional experts conducted a comprehensive assessment, 
which found a ―system that is broken almost everywhere you 
look.‖60  
Youths are subject to being warehoused in huge living 
units with low staffing levels and are largely denied the 
educational and rehabilitative programming necessary for 
successful re-entry.  Instead, the Department has capitulated 
to the gang culture with youths housed by gang affiliation, and 
the excessive use of lockdowns and isolation to manage 
violence.  Because of the program reductions and the 
imposition of increased sentences for infractions, California 
minors‘ time in custody is almost triple the national average.61  
Like its adult counterpart, the juvenile system provides 
inadequate medical and mental health care. 
In January of 2007, CDCR reported that it housed 2,647 
juveniles with 3,776 staff members, of which 1,970 were 
custody staff, at a rate of $175,000 per year per juvenile.62  As 
of March 31, 2009, Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) 
 
59. See CHRISTOPHER MURRAY ET AL., SAFETY AND WELFARE PLAN: 
IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/DJJ_Safety_and_Welfare%20Plan.pdf. 
60. Id. at 1. 
61.  With an average stay of 35.3 months, total per capita ward costs are 
nearly $800,000, not including parole supervision costs.  See CAL. DEP‘T OF 
CORR. & REHAB., POPULATION OVERVIEW 2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/POPOVER2008.pdf.  
See also CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., SAFETY AND WELFARE PLAN: 
IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/DJJ_Safety_and_Welfare%20Plan.pdf. 
62. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Summary 
Fact Sheet, www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/summarys.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2010). 
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housed 1,637 wards in six institutions at an estimated cost of 
approximately $234,029 per ward.63  ―With an average stay of 
35.3 months, total per capita ward costs are nearly $800,000, 
not including parole supervision costs.‖64  Despite the 
unprecedented expenditures by the CDCR/DJJ, there has been 
little progress in achieving reform and improving conditions. 
While there are almost two highly-paid union staff 
members for every juvenile incarcerated at DJJ, California has 
one of the highest student–teacher ratios at 20.9 students per 
teacher compared to the national average of 15.5.65  California 
has consistently fallen below the national average in per-pupil 
expenditures, ranking 24th in 2006–2007.66  The state also 
ranked almost last in terms of the ratio of total school staff to 
students in 2006–2007, according to the National Center for 
Education Statistics (―NCES‖): 72% of school staff members as 
the average State; 39% of district officials/administrators as 
the national average; and only 71% of school principals and 
assistant principals as the national average.67 
 
63. For the 2010 budget, see generally CAL. DEP‘T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
GOVERNOR‘S BUDGET (2010), available at 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/GovernorsBudget/5210/5225.pdf. 
64. DANIEL MACALLAIR, MIKE MALES, & CATHERINE MCCRACKEN, CTR. ON 
JUVENILE CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CLOSING CALIFORNIA‘S DIVISION OF JUVENILE 
FACILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 2 (2009), 
available at www.cjcj.org/files/closing_californias_DJF.pdf.  
65. National Center for Education Statistics, Student/Teacher Ratios in 
Public Schools, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2009/section4/indicator31.asp#info (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2010).  With almost 6.5 million kids in public school, 
California only has 307,000 teachers.  See also Ed-Data Website, 
http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/Navigation/fsTwoPanel.asp?bottom=/Articles/Article.asp%3Fti
tle%3DHow%2520California%2520Compares (providing student-to-teacher 
ratios in California public schools) (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  California 
had nearly 307,000 teachers in its schools in 2008-09.  See Ed-Data Website, 
Teachers in California, http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/articles/Article.asp?title=Teachers%20IN%20CALIFORNIA 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
66. NAT‘L EDUC. ASS‘N, RANKING AND ESTIMATES 2008-2009, at 67, 95-96 
(2008), available at http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/09rankings.pdf.  
According to the National Education Association's (―NEA‖) Rankings and 
Estimates 2008–09 and unadjusted for regional cost differences, at $9,124 per 
pupil, California was at 95% of the national average of $9,565.  Id.  
67. EdSource, Staff-per-Pupil Ratios in California 2006-07, 
http://www.edsource.org/data_StaffPupilRatios0607.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2010). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/5
2010] THE QUIXOTIC DILEMMA 1467 
With respect to teachers, California ranked 49th, with 74% 
as many as the national average.68  It ranked 51st—last—on 
guidance counselors and librarians.69  California had only 1.0 
guidance counselor per 1,000 students, compared with an 
average of 2.1 nationally, and only 0.2 librarians per 1,000 
students, compared with 1.1 nationally.70 
Like the adult facilities, the deplorable conditions in the 
juvenile facilities have been litigated for a number of years.  
Most recently, taxpayers filed suit in state court in the case of 
Farrell v. Cate.71  In an October 2008 hearing, Judge Jon Tigar, 
while presiding over the Farrell consent decree, grimly 
observed that after nearly four years of judicial intervention, 
the conditions that gave rise to the consent decree remained 
the same and ―DJJ [was] in gross violation of the Court‘s 
order.‖72  
―In rebuking the state for its failure‖ to remediate the 
problems and comply with the consent decree, Judge Tigar 
pointed to the State‘s failure: 
to take even the most basic, foundational steps to 
implement reform. For example, the parties 
agree[d] that the DJJ is a policy-driven agency, 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  The average teacher salary in California was $63,640 in 2006–
07, according to the NEA, higher than any other state.  EdSource, California 
Rankings 2006-07, http://www.edsource.org/data_carankings06-07.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2010).  The U.S. average was $50,758.  Id.  However, the 
relatively higher cost of living in California is a significant factor.  When 
comparing teacher salaries among states, both the cost of living in each state 
and the seniority of the workforce play a role.  The American Federation of 
Teachers looked at average teacher salaries in 2000–01 and determined that 
when cost-of-living factors were taken into account, California ranked 16th in 
the nation.  AM. FED‘N OF TEACHERS, SURVEY & ANALYSIS OF TEACHER SALARY 
TRENDS 2001, at 19 (2002), available at 
http://archive.aft.org/salary/2001/download/salarysurvey01.pdf. 
71. The case was originally filed under a different party name.  See 
Consent Decree, Farrell v. Hickman, No. RG03079344, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 
31, 2005).  See also GERI LYNN GREEN ET AL., CONDITIONS AND CONDUCT IN THE 
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REPORT ON U.S. GOVERNMENT 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR) at n. xi (2006), available at 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files/ushrn/images/linkfiles/CERD/10c_Californi
a%20Prisons.pdf. 
72. MACALLAIR, MALES & MCCRACKEN, supra note 61, at 2 (internal 
citation omitted).    
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and the development of new policies is a 
prerequisite to implementation of reform.  By its 
own witness‘ admission, however, DJJ ha[d] 
written only 12 policies in the last year out of the 
800 necessary for implementation of the 
remedial plans—and not all of those 12 even 
relate to the remedial plans. DJJ has neither a 
date to develop the remaining policies nor a date 
to set a date to develop them.73 
The demonstrated inability of DJJ to institute mandated 
reforms despite unprecedented expenditures calls into question 
the wisdom of continuing the current course.  Recent reports by 
California‘s nonpartisan Little Hoover Commission (LHC) and 
Legislative Analyst‘s Office (LAO) have called for the closing of 
the six remaining DJF institutions and transferring full 
responsibility for the delivery of juvenile justice services to 
county probation departments. 
 
II.  There Is No Magic Bullet 
 
Because many factors have played a role in bringing 
California‘s penal system to this deplorable state, no one-
dimensional answer, such as increased oversight, will 
remediate the tremendous problems facing the State.  It must 
be noted that California, prior to this period, had evidenced an 
interest in promoting transparency and accountability in its 
penal system, being one of the only states to adopt a state 
regulatory scheme setting forth minimum standards of 
treatment of prisoners.  Included therein was a state oversight 
body and comprehensive training systems.74  However, the 
failure on the part of the state legislature to make these 
standards mandatory instead of merely permissive has 
severely reduced their effectiveness. 
Moreover, California‘s sheer enormity is a natural 
obstruction to any meaningful oversight.  The great distances 
of travel required to visit many of California‘s prisons keeps 
family and friends away.  Lawyers rarely visit.  Even with all 
 
73. Id. at 2-3. 
74. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 (2010).  See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030 
(Deering 2009). 
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the monitors, experts, overseers, and ombudsman in place 
today as a result of the litigation, the necessity of traveling 
hundreds of miles to visit one institution is a significant barrier 
to regular and effective oversight.  The great distance and 
costly telephone calls make it difficult for families to stay 
connected with loved ones; thus they continue to be 
uninformed.  The remote placement of its prisons also makes it 
nearly impossible for charitable organizations, medical and 
mental health staff, or any non-department interns to work in 
the facility.  Hence, California‘s Central Valley is dotted up and 
down with prison towns, virtually company towns in which 
there is little social or political will to buck the system.  Hence, 
the institutions operate virtually behind a concrete veil of 
secrecy.  This designed obscurity has been further exacerbated 
with an unprecedented expansion of the prison system. 
Historically, judicial oversight through large class-action 
lawsuits served as one means for generating widespread 
systemic change, providing leverage over reluctant state 
legislators concerned about political capital, to provide needed 
resources.75  However, with the passage of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA) in 1996, that sort of oversight became 
almost nonexistent.  Specifically, federal lawsuits are now 
virtually impossible to file as a result of restrictive provisions 
and the substantial disincentives to qualified, experienced, 
competent lawyers to do this highly complex work, such as fee 
caps, the elimination of the catalyst theory which allowed for 
the recovery of attorneys‘ fees when the litigation resulted in 
significant change, and the requirement that the attorney fund 
the cost of experts even in the remedial phase of successful 
litigation. 
The Department of Corrections employs one-fifth of 
California‘s state employees.76  Those sixty-six thousand 
employees belong to a labor union, the California Correctional 
Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).  In the mid-1980s, the 
CCPOA began an aggressive agenda to further promote prison 
 
75. Written Testimony Submitted to the Comm’n on Safety & Abuse in 
America’s Prisons—4th Hearing (June 2, 2006), available at 
http://prisoncommission.org/transcripts/public_hearing_4_day_2_f_litigation.
pdf. 
76.  See U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Employment Data, 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/08stca.txt (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
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expansion and ensure a growing inmate population, lavishing 
campaign contributions on friendly legislators and governors, 
with the inevitable resultant expansion of its membership and 
power. 
In 1994, the union made history when it donated $425,000 
to Pete Wilson‘s gubernatorial campaign—the largest single 
donation in California history up to that time.  After his 
election, Wilson rewarded the prison guards with hefty salary 
increases and harsher sentencing policies.  In that same year, 
the ―Three Strikes‖ sentencing enhancement initiative, 
strongly supported by CCPOA, was placed on the ballot. 
In 1995, Governor Wilson rewarded the union when he 
pushed through trend-setting legislation to ban all journalists 
from interviewing any prisoners.  California‘s relatively weak 
public-records law already prohibited the public and the media 
from inspecting a peace officer‘s personnel file without a court 
order or the permission of the police agency, which posed a 
significant obstacle to journalists trying to accurately 
determine and report on the facts concerning police or 
correctional officer misconduct.  With the media banned from 
individual interviews of inmates, any meaningful transparency 
or accountability over the California Department of Corrections 
became nearly impossible. 
In 1998, the union contributed a total of $2 million to Gray 
Davis‘s campaign.  As governor, Davis virtually surrendered 
control of all corrections matters to the CCPOA and its 
leadership.  The union‘s remarkable influence over Davis and 
his administration became glaringly apparent in 2002 when he 
signed a new contract guaranteeing a 37.7 percent increase in 
guards‘ pay77 at the same time that California was confronting 
the most serious fiscal crisis in recent history.78 
 
77. ―Under this contract, a guard with seven years of service who earned 
$53,000 per year would receive a yearly salary of $73,000.‖  POLITICAL 
RESEARCH ASSOCS., PROFITS FROM INCARCERATION 219 (2005), available at 
http://www.defendingjustice.org/pdfs/chapters/incarceration.pdf.  Today, with 
overtime and further raises guaranteed under the contract, guards can earn 
more than $110,000 annually and all with only a high school GED.  Id. 
78. By 2002, approximately thirty-five percent of the CCPOA‘s yearly 
budget of $22 million was dedicated to political activities, ―including 
donations to elected officials. (The remaining $14 million cover[ed] general 
operations such as the salaries of 71 full-time employees, including 20 
attorneys).‖  Daniel Macallair, Prisons: Power Nobody Dares Mess With, 
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With the advent of term limits, the CCPOA has expanded 
its reach to local elections.  By contributing to the campaigns of 
local candidates, the union is quietly building alliances with 
elected county officials on the assumption that many will 
ultimately serve in the Legislature. 
This has had a profound effect on the prison system, as the 
California Legislature controls the allocation of funding for 
state prisons and the criminal justice system as a whole.  Even 
funding decisions for local programs are often in the hands of 
the state legislators.  Pleas to fund local programs that would 
divert low-level non-violent offenders or those suffering from 
mentally illness and substance abusers out of the state prison 
system have fallen on deaf ears.  The budget today is so 
complex and convoluted that few people, if any, are qualified or 
able to engage in any sort of meaningful review of the 
allocation of state resources.  Moreover, federal funding to local 
programs has been severely cut back over the years, leaving 
counties and municipalities without the means by which to 
treat, care for, and rehabilitate their own low–level offenders, 
mentally ill, and substance abusers. 
It is not merely the prison system that finds itself in ruins 
today.  California‘s entire political system has been rendered 
dysfunctional by what many are beginning to realize may be a 
misguided electoral process.  The political will to engage in 
responsible governance has been so compromised by special 
interests that the Legislature has effectively been 
incapacitated; the leaders of the executive branch find 
themselves at odds with their own agencies and the state 
judiciary is now conflicted with the politicization of the bench. 
While the availability of judicial intervention has been 
proven to be a necessity, it alone is not sufficient to ensure 
transparency and accountability.  In 1995, a year before the 
PLRA passed, female prisoners filed a lawsuit challenging the 
grossly inadequate medical care at two California state 
prisons.79  In 1997, a settlement was reached.80  The California 
 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 29, 2004, http://www.three-strikes-
legal.com/prison_guard_union.html. 
79. Shumate v. Wilson, No. 2:95-cv-00619-WBS-JFM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 
1995). 
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Department of Corrections (CDC) agreed to make 
improvements in the quality of health care at one of the 
women‘s prisons.81  However, the judicial monitors soon left 
and those changes were never made.  In fact, the situation 
continues to worsen. 
On a recent visit to San Quentin, Judge Henderson was 
taken aback at the depths to which San Quentin‘s medical 
facility was allowed to sink, even in the aftermath of his careful 
and productive judicial intervention in Marin v. Rushen.82 
What has become clear is that the bureaucracy‘s 
―entrenched paralysis‖83 is not a one-dimensional problem that 
a judge alone can solve by wielding the power of his pen.  As 
the spate of litigation has proven over the past two decades, the 
courts are limited as to what they can do to ameliorate the 
problem.  Beyond recognizing and identifying that the situation 
is dire and unconstitutional, and calling for change, the courts 
are without the necessary tools to solve the problem. 
The problem, instead, is systemic and must be addressed 
in a holistic manner.  Over the past three decades, we have 
passed laws criminalizing behaviors not previously resulting in 
prison commitments, while mandating and lengthening 
sentences as opposed to alternative methods, thereby ensuring 
a never-ending and increasing supply of prisoners.  The 
politicization of the state courts over the last twenty-five years, 
together with the appointment of younger judges, many of 
whom come out of the prosecutorial ranks, who look upon the 
position as a career, as opposed to public service, has led to 
judges becoming wary of being demonized as ―soft on 
criminals,‖ which could make it more difficult to win reelection.  
Such a concern causes judges to be reluctant to exercise 
discretion in imposing alternative, or lighter, sentences even 
when they are afforded the opportunity. 
Even if we reduced the prison population as the three-
judge panel in Plata/Coleman has ordered,84 with a politically 
 
80. Amy Petré Hill, Death Through Administrative Indifference: The 
Prison Reform Act Allows Women to Die in California’s Substandard Prison 
Health Care System, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 223, 226 (2002). 
81. See id. 
82. Marin v. Rushen, No. 80-0012 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1982). 
83. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
84. See id.; Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 4, 2009). 
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compromised bench, harsh sentencing laws in place, and the 
lack of local solutions, the prisons will once again be busting at 
the seams in short order.  As the laws are presently written, 
there will be a never-ending, exponentially growing supply of 
prisoners for a finite number of beds, staff and resources.  
Perhaps with the budget in crisis, the prisons running at 200-
300% occupancy, schools closing, class sizes increasing, 
community colleges reducing classes, state college costs 
skyrocketing, local community hospitals being forced to close, 
cities and counties finding themselves forced into bankruptcy, 
and the infrastructure of California in severe disrepair after 
decades of deferred maintenance, we are at a tipping point.  
Possibly, California will start to embrace the fact that the 
answer is not one-dimensional, but one requiring a 
comprehensive non-political or politicized approach.  The 
enormity of the problems, admittedly, seems overwhelming and 
unmanageable.  For instance, one of the realities is that 
decarceration will have a tremendous effect on unemployment.  
If we were to reduce the prison population by 50%, so that the 
prisons were running at 100% occupancy, we would release 
some 70,000-80,000 people into an already-strapped work force.  
This does not take into account the more than 30,000 CDCR 
employees who will no longer be necessary, not to mention the 
vast numbers of parole agents, administrators, and other 
positions in the criminal justice system who may be affected.  
Clearly, any meaningful reduction in prison population will 
severely affect the unemployment rate unless, of course, we 
redirect that labor pool somewhere else.  However, both 
prisoners and CDCR staff are largely workers with low 
education levels, which exacerbates the problem.  Up until 
now, inertia seemed the only answer, but with low-educated 
custody staff making over $100,000 per year, and inmates 
costing $50,000-$230,000 per year, it might be time to look at 
alternatives.  There are generally two means by which 
government can remove workers from the labor pool: 
incarceration and education.  Californians are faced with a 
choice.  Just as for every action there is a consequence, failure 
to act carries with it its own consequences. 
Beds cannot be built, or facilities staffed, fast enough to 
accommodate the expanding numbers of prisoners.  With the 
failure of the medical and mental health systems throughout 
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the state, as well as the lengthy prison commitments 
incarcerating people well into old age, the prison population is 
needier and far more expensive to care for than ever before. 
We must first ask ourselves: do we want to continue to be 
the nation with the highest incarceration rate that the world 
has ever seen?  Do we wish as a society to join the ranks of 
those we previously condemned, such as Russia‘s Gulag?  Can 
we afford it?  Do we want to continue to have well-kept prison 
facilities while we allow our children to attend schools 
crumbling from the decades of deferred maintenance?  What 
other social goods will be defeated by continuing down this 
road?  Are we willing to give up our world-class education 
system, our parks, our infrastructure, our basic quality of life 
here in California in order to imprison hundreds of thousands 
of people?  If so, Californians may be in for much worse times.  
The budget crises we now are facing may be just the beginning. 
California‘s tremendous success has been due in large part 
to the tremendous investment in education, which gave us a 
competitive edge on the world stage.  Are we really willing to 
give up such a tremendous economic advantage in order to 
continue to incarcerate hundreds of thousands of our citizens 
when education, care and rehabilitation are far more cost-
effective? 
With the state Legislature held hostage by special 
interests, the court‘s hands tied with the passage of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, the media ban, and by the enormity of 
the California Department of Corrections, Californians, 
themselves, must stand up and demand accountability. 
These are tough times, with a very rocky uncharted road 
ahead.  But it is time we, as Californians, accepted our reality, 
took charge, and demanded that our government officials act 
responsibly in the State‘s best interest, instead of their own.  
Current awareness tells us we do not have a choice.  Instead of 
searching for someone to blame and hoping for a quick fix, we 
must all ask ourselves what we might contribute to starting to 
reverse this process. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
California has a difficult road ahead in the restructuring, 
rebuilding, and rethinking of its attitudes towards 
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incarceration and responsible governance.  It will require vast 
reform, including not only in the prison-condition context, but 
also in the implementation of decarceration strategies.  To do 
so, the political landscape must be reformed as well.  This will 
only happen with an informed electorate.  Transparency and 
accountability are the first steps that must be taken to garner 
the political will to make the necessary changes towards 
responsible democratic governance. 
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